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Abstract—In this paper, we propose an active attacking strat-
egy on a massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) net-
work, where the pilot sequences are obtained using the user load-
achieving pilot sequence design. The user load-achieving design
ensures that the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR)
requirements of all the users in the massive MIMO networks are
guaranteed even in the presence of pilot contamination. However,
this design has some vulnerabilities, such as one known pilot
sequence and the correlation among the pilot sequences, that
may be exploited by active attackers. In this work, we first
identify the potential vulnerabilities in the user load-achieving
pilot sequence design and then, accordingly, develop an active
attacking strategy on the network. In the proposed attacking
strategy, the active attackers transmit known pilot sequences
in the uplink training and artificial noise in the downlink
data transmission. Our examination demonstrates that the per-
cell user load region is significantly reduced by the proposed
attacking strategy. As a result of the reduced per-cell user load
region, the SINR requirements of all the users are no longer
guaranteed in the presence of the active attackers. Specifically,
for the worst affected users the SINR requirements may not be
ensured even with infinite antennas at the base station.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technology
is considered as one of the key enablers of the future fifth gen-
eration (5G) wireless networks. In a massive MIMO network,
base stations (BSs) are equipped with hundreds of antennas.
Massive MIMO provides a number of lucrative advantages
over the conventional MIMO systems. One of these benefits
is the increase in the spectral and energy efficiency [1]. In
addition, the use of massive MIMO technologies achieves
a higher throughput and reliability [2]. Another important
advantage of massive MIMO is that the channels between BSs
and users become increasingly orthogonal [3] as the number
of antennas at BSs increases, which leads to the fact that
the interference in the network will be significantly reduced.
Recent research in the context of massive MIMO focused on
resolving some specific key issues that limit the performance
of massive MIMO. Among these issues, pilot contamination
is considered as the most severe performance degrading factor
in massive MIMO networks [3].
Pilot contamination occurs when the number of users in a
cell is larger than the number of orthogonal pilot sequences,
i.e., when it is not possible to allocate orthogonal pilot
sequences to all the users and thus the pilot sequences are
reused in the network. Pilot contamination is a performance
bottleneck in massive MIMO networks [4]–[6], because it
still exists even when the number of antennas at the BSs
approaches infinity. As such, a lot of recent research works
focused on mitigating or reducing the detrimental affects of
pilot contamination in massive MIMO networks (e.g., [3], [7]–
[11]). The recent research in pilot contamination can be gener-
ally categorized into five groups: protocol based methods [8],
precoding based methods [9], angle-of-arrival based methods
[12], blind methods [11], and pilot sequence design methods
[3], [7], [13]–[15].
Recently, a user load-achieving pilot sequence design algo-
rithm has been proposed for a multi-cell multi-user massive
MIMO network [3] and the thorough performance analysis
of this algorithm has been conducted [7]. The key idea of
the user load-achieving pilot design is to first determine the
user load region of the network under pilot contamination.
Then, the algorithm allocates pilot sequences for all users in a
distributed manner, which requires very little BS cooperation.
The algorithm also allocates the downlink transmit power for
all the users at BSs, such that the signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) requirements of all the users in the network
can be guaranteed. We note that the user load-achieving pilot
sequence design [7] is also referred to as the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design in [3]. The main advantage
of the user load-achieving pilot design is that it guarantees
the SINR requirements for all the users in the network when
some specific conditions are met. We would like to highlight
that as long as the SINR requirements are within the per-
cell user load region, the pilot sequence design and downlink
transmit power allocation can ensure the SINR requirements
of all the users. Otherwise, the pilot sequence design may not
be feasible to guarantee the SINR requirements of all the users
in the considered massive MIMO network.
In this paper, we propose a strategy for an active attacker
who aims at exploiting the vulnerability in the user load-
achieving pilot sequence design to degrade the performance of
massive MIMO networks. In the proposed strategy, the attacker
exploits the known properties of the user load-achieving pilot
design to deliberately increase the pilot contamination in
the uplink training phase. In addition, during the downlink
transmission phase, the active attacker transmits artificial noise
(AN) to increase the interference to each user in the network.
Notably, the attack strategy carefully exploits the design of the
user load-achieving pilot design and degrades its performance,
such that the SINR requirements for all the users in the
network are no longer guaranteed with a certain number of
antennas at the BS. We recall that the goal of the user load-
achieving pilot design is to ensure the SINR requirements for
all the users in the network. This goal cannot be achieved in
the the presence of the active attacker with the proposed attack
strategy. The main contributions of this work are summarized
as follows.
1) We identify potential vulnerabilities in the user load-
achieving pilot sequence design. As shown in this work,
these vulnerabilities can be exploited by an active at-
tacker to significantly degrade the performance of a mas-
sive MIMO network, such that the SINR requirements
of all the users in the network cannot be guaranteed by
the user load-achieving pilot sequence design.
2) We propose an active attacking strategy on the user
load-achieving pilot sequence design in massive MIMO
networks. Our examination shows that the user load re-
gion achieved by the user load-achieving pilot sequence
design is significantly reduced by the active attacker,
such that the diverse range of SINR requirements is no
longer supported. Specifically, with the active attack the
SINR requirements for some users cannot be guaranteed
even with an infinite number of antennas at the BSs.
II. USER LOAD-ACHIEVING PILOT SEQUENCE DESIGN
AND ITS VULNERABILITIES
For the sake of completeness, in this section we first
present the process for the user load-achieving pilot sequence
design [3], [7] and then identify its vulnerabilities that can be
exploited by an active attacker.
A. User Load-Achieving Pilot Sequence Design
In the user load-achieving pilot sequence design, the user
load is defined as the number of users that can be simultane-
ously served in a pilot-contaminated massive MIMO network,
such that the SINR requirement of each individual user is guar-
anteed. To this end, the user load-achieving pilot design first
determines the user load region of the network and then de-
signs the pilot sequences accordingly. The key benefit achieved
by this design is that it is capable of ensuring a diverse range
of the SINR requirements for all the users simultaneously in
the pilot-contaminated massive MIMO network. A thorough
comparison of the design with existing pilot sequence designs
demonstrates that the user load-achieving design can achieve a
larger user load region and support a greater and diverse range
of the SINR requirements. In addition, the user load-achieving
pilot design guarantees the SINR requirement of all the users
in the network with a finite Nt, where Nt is the number of
antennas at each BS. Meanwhile, the existing pilot designs are
unable to support such diverse SINR requirements even with
an infinite Nt. We next present the vulnerabilities in the user
load-achieving pilot sequence design, which can be exploited
by an active attacker.
B. Vulnerabilities in the User Load-Achieving Pilot Design
We first find that the user load-achieving pilot sequence
design always outputs the pilot sequence of the form
[1, 0, · · · , 0]T for one user in each cell. As such, when the
length of the pilot sequence is known, the attacker can figure
out the pilot sequence assigned to at least one user in each
cell. Furthermore, we note that the user load-achieving pilot
sequence design modifies the SINR requirements for all the
users in the network such that the SINR requirements lie
on the upper surface boundary of the user load region. This
SINR modification ensures that the benefits offered by the
large user load region of the user load-achieving pilot design
are fully utilized. On the other side of the coin, this SINR
modification introduces the potential vulnerability in the pilot
design (i.e., the known sequence [1, 0, · · · , 0]T ). Importantly,
in the presence of active attackers, the SINR requirements may
no longer remain inside the user load region. Consequently, the
SINR requirements of all the users in the network will not be
guaranteed. Another vulnerability in the user load-achieving
design is that all the pilot sequences designed for the network
are correlated with each other. As such, if the attacker even
knows one pilot sequences in the network, it can potentially
contaminate the channel estimates of all the users in the
massive MIMO network. We note that an attacker only needs
to know two network parameters for successfully exploiting
the user load-achieving pilot design, i.e., the length of the pilot
sequence, and the information that user load-achieving pilot
design is being used in the network. We highlight that these
parameters are easy to obtain in any network. Throughout this
paper, we assume that the attacker has knowledge of these
network parameters.
III. MULTI-CELL MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS WITH
ACTIVE ATTACKERS
In this section, we first detail the adopted system model and
related assumptions. Then, we present the channel estimation
and data transmission in the presence of the active attackers.
A. System Model and Adopted Assumptions
We consider a multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO net-
work, where there are L cells and each of them has K single-
antenna users, as depicted in Fig. 1. One BS is located in
the center of each cell and is equipped with Nt antennas. We
assume that there is one active attacker present in each cell and
thus totally there are L active attackers in the network. We also
assume that the communication channels in the network suffer
from both large-scale and small-scale propagation effects. We
denote the large-scale propagation factor from the jth user in
the ith cell to the BS in the lth cell as βij l. Additionally,
we denote the small-scale propagation factor from the jth
user in the ith cell to the nth BS antenna in the lth cell as
hij ln . Consequently, the uplink propagation factor from the
jth user in the ith cell to the nth BS antenna in the lth
cell is represented as
√
βij lhij ln . Furthermore, we assume
the the small-scale propagation factor is Rayleigh distributed,
i.e., hij ln ∼ CN (0, 1). We assume that the network operates
in the time-division-duplex (TDD) mode. The entire trans-
mission, consisting of the uplink training and the downlink
data transmission, occurs within one coherence block. As
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Fig. 1. An illustration of a multi-cell multi-user massive MIMO network in
the presence of active attackers. Legitimate users are represented by black
circles and active attackers are represented by red triangles.
such, we assume that the uplink and the downlink channels
remain unchanged for the entire transmission. As a result,
the channel estimates in the uplink can be utilized for the
downlink precoding [16], [17]. We next detail the uplink
channel estimation and downlink data transmission in the
following two subsections.
B. Channel Estimation with Active Attackers
During the uplink training phase, the BS estimates the
propagation factors from the users in a cell to the same-cell
BS. Each user in a cell transmits a pre-assigned pilot sequence
to the same-cell BS. We assume that all pilot sequences have
unit energy. Additionally, the length of a pilot sequence is
τ , which is assumed to be the same for all the users in the
network. In the presence of active attackers, the observation
received at the BS in the lth cell during the uplink training
phase, denoted by sl, is given by
sl =
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
ηij lQijhij l +
L∑
m=1
ηmAlQmAhmAl + nl, (1)
where ηij l =
√
pijβij l, Qij = qij ⊗ INt is the pilot matrix,
qij is the pilot sequence assigned to the jth user in the ith cell,
⊗ represents the Kronecker product, INt denotes the Nt×Nt
identity matrix, pij is the pilot power for the jth user in the
ith cell, hij l = [hij l1 , hij l2 , . . . , hij ln ]
T is an Nt × 1 uplink
channel vector from the jth user in the ith cell to the BS in the
lth cell, and nl is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
at the BS in the lth cell. We highlight that the second term in
the observation given in (1) is due to the presence of the L
active attackers in the network.
Exploiting the structure of the pilot sequences generated
by the user load-achieving pilot sequence design, we assume
that all the attackers in the network transmit the known pilot
sequence, i.e.,QmA = Q1j , where the pilot sequence assigned
to Q1j is in the form [1, 0, · · · , 0]
T . Accordingly, the uplink
channel from the kth user in the lth cell to the BS in the lth
cell is obtained by utilizing the property of the pilot sequence
matrix, given by QTlkQlk = INt . Based on (1) and assuming
that the uplink power control is enabled with ηlkl = 1, the BS
in the lth cell obtains the least square (LS) channel estimate
for hlkl as gˆlkl = Q
T
lk
sl. We rewrite gˆlkl as
gˆlkl=hlkl+
∑
i,j 6=l,k
ηij lρij lkhij l+
L∑
m=1
ηmAlρmAlkhmAl+n¯l,
(2)
where QTlk denotes the matrix transpose of Qlk , n¯l = Q
T
lk
nl,∑
i,j 6=l,k =
∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1 with the condition (i, j) 6= (l, k), and
ρij lk is the correlation coefficient between pilot sequences,
defined as ρij lk = q
T
lk
qij , k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. We highlight
that the uplink power control is not applied for the active
attackers because the BSs are not aware of their presence.
In the user load-achieving pilot design, we have the value
range of the correlation ρij lk in (2) as −1 ≤ ρij lk ≤ +1.
If all the users are assigned orthogonal pilot sequences, we
have ρij lk = 0 and thus no pilot contamination. In massive
MIMO networks, ρij lk is nonzero due to the limited number
of orthogonal pilot sequences and thus pilot contamination
always exists. With the knowledge of pilot sequence assigned
to one user in each cell, the active attackers can deteriorate the
quality of the channel estimate by increasing pilot contamina-
tion, which is confirmed by the second term in (2). We note
that the pilot sequences obtained from the user load-achieving
design are correlated with each other. As such, the attacks
not only affect the users with the pilot sequence of the form
[1, 0, · · · , 0]T , but all the users in the network.
C. Data Transmission via the Downlink
We now focus on the downlink data transmission in the
massive MIMO network. We assume that the attackers are
active during this phase and transmit AN, while each BS
transmits the downlink data symbols to the same-cell users.
We denote the data symbol intended for the kth user in the lth
cell as xlk . We also assume that the downlink transmit power
for the symbol xlk at the BS is given as E
[
xHlkxlk
]
= Plk ,
where E[·] denotes the expectation operation. Based on the
channel estimates obtained during the uplink training and the
reciprocity between the uplink and downlink channels for the
TDD mode, the BS performs a linear precoding using a vector
a. Thus, the received signal at the kth user in the lth cell is
given by
yˆlk =
L∑
m=1
K∑
n=1
√
βlkmh
H
lkm
(amnxmn) + wlk , (3)
where wlk =
∑L
m=1 PmAwmA + w¯lk . Specifically, wmA is
the AN generated by the active attacker in the mth cell with
transmit power PmA , and w¯lk is the AWGN at the kth user
in the lth cell. Assuming that users only have the statistical
φlk,Nt =
(
E
[
hHlklalk
])2
βlklPlk
var
[
hHlklalk
]
βlklPlk +
∑
m,n6=l,k E
[
|hHlkmamn |
2
]
βlkmPmn + σ
2
w
. (5)
φlk,Nt =
βlklPlk
(δlk + αlk)
[ ∑
m,n6=l,k
ρ2
lkmn
η2
lkm
βlkmPmn
(δmn+αmn )
+ 1
Nt
(∑L
m=1
∑K
n=1 βlkmPmn + σ
2
w
)] . (11)
information of the channel [9], [18], we rewrite yˆlk in (3) as
yˆlk =
√
βlklE
[
hHlklalk
]
xlk+
√
βlkl
(
hHlklalk−E
[
hHlklalk
])
xlk
+
∑
m,n6=l,k
√
βlkmh
H
lkm
(amnxmn) + wlk . (4)
We now present the expressions for the achievable SINR for
the kth user in the lth cell. We denote the achievable downlink
SINR at the kth user in the lth cell by φlk,Nt . We note that
the first term in (4) represents the signal intended for the kth
user in the lth cell. We assume that the remanding terms in
(4) are uncorrelated with the intended signal and are treated
as the effective noise. Accordingly, we express SINR φlk,Nt
as (5) given on the top of the page, where var [·] denotes the
variance operation, and σ2w denotes the variance of wlk . We
note that the SINR expression (5) is a generalised expression
valid for any type of linear precoding vector alk . Notably, we
observe that the linear precoding vector is based on the channel
estimates obtained by the uplink training phase. As such, pilot
contamination in the uplink training affects the downlink data
transmission.
In this work, we consider that the BS performs maximum-
ratio transmission (MRT) precoding [3], [18], which is given
by
alk =
gˆlkl
‖gˆlkl‖
=
gˆlkl√
Nt
(
gˆHlklgˆlkl/Nt
) , (6)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2 norm. We now simplify the denom-
inator in (6) by utilizing the fact that the channels in massive
MIMO become increasingly orthogonal when the number of
antennas at the BS (i.e., Nt) increases. This phenomenon is
known as channel hardening and is represented as
1
Nt
hHijihlkl =
{
1, ∀ (i, j) = (l, k)
0, otherwise.
(7)
Using (7), we now simplify the denominator in (6) as
gˆHlklgˆlkl
Nt
=
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
η2ij lρ
2
ij lk
+
L∑
m=1
η2mAlρ
2
mAlk
+ σ2nl
= (δlk + αlk) , (8)
where αlk =
∑L
m=1 η
2
mAl
ρ2mAlk and
δlk =
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
η2ij lρ
2
ij lk
+ σ2nl . (9)
Substituting (8) into (6), we obtain the precoding vector as
alk =
gˆlkl√
Nt (δlk + αlk)
. (10)
We highlight that αlk in (10) appears due to the pilot contam-
ination caused by the active attackers. As such, the channel
estimate gˆlkl suffers from increased pilot contamination in the
presence of the active attackers. We next present the closed
form expression for φlk,Nt , when the BSs adopt the precoding
vector given in (10) and the channel estimates are obtained
using the LS channel estimation given in (2).
Lemma 1: When the BSs adopt the precoding vector given
in (10) and the channel estimates are obtained using the LS
channel estimation given in (2), the SINR at kth user in the
lth cell is given in (11) at the top of the page.
In massive MIMO, each BS is equipped with a large number
of antennas. We next present the asymptotic SINR when
Nt → ∞. Following (11), as Nt → ∞ the asymptotic SINR
expression for φlk,Nt , denoted by φlk,∞, is given by
φlk,∞=
βlklPlk
(δlk+αlk)
(
L∑
m=1
K∑
n=1
ρ2
lkmn
η2
lkm
βlkmPmn
(δmn+αmn )
)
−βlklPlk
.
(12)
We obtain some interesting observations from the the asymp-
totic SINR expression given by (12). The expression reveals
that the pilot contamination still exists and limits the perfor-
mance of massive MIMO, even when each BS is equipped with
an infinite number of antennas. Furthermore, the increased pi-
lot contamination due to the active attackers does not disappear
in massive MIMO regime, i.e., αmn still exists whenNt →∞.
IV. USER LOAD REGION IN MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS
WITH ACTIVE ATTACKERS
In this section, we present the user load region of the
massive MIMO network in the presence of the active attackers,
while the user load region without the active attackers is
provided as a benchmark.
The user load-achieving pilot sequence design [3], [7]
guarantees the SINR requirements of all the users under the
user load region. For comparison, we first represent the per-
cell user load region of the massive MIMO network without
active attackers, which is given by
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
(
γij
1 + γij
)
≤
τ
L
, (13)
where γij is the SINR requirement of the ith user in the jth
cell. Furthermore, γij/(1 + γij ) denotes the effective band-
width of the ith user in the jth cell. The bound on the user
load signifies the region under which the user load is achieved,
which means that the SINR requirements of all the users in
the network are guaranteed.
We now examine the impact of the active attackers on the
user load region. As evident from (11), the active attacks in
the network lead to the reduction in the achievable SINR. The
derivations for user load region with the active attackers are
omitted here due to space limitations. Following the similar
approach as given in [3], [7], the per-cell user load region in
the presence of the active attackers is given by
K∑
j=1
(
γij
1 + γij
)
+
(
γmA
1 + γmA
)
≤
τ
L
, (14)
where γmA/(1 + γmA) denotes the effective bandwidth of the
active attacker in the mth cell.
We note that having active attackers in the network results
in the reduction of the user load region. The BSs deign the
user-load achieving pilot sequences based on the load region
given in (13). We also note that the SINR requirements of all
the users in the network can only be guaranteed within the
user load region given in (13). With the active attackers, the
user load region of the network is reduced to the one given in
(14). As such, the SINR requirements of all the users in the
network may not be supported by the BSs in the presence of
the active attackers.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the proposed active
attack strategy and compare the performance of the massive
MIMO network with and without the active attackers. Specif-
ically, we present numerical results to demonstrate the perfor-
mance degradation cased by the active attackers. Throughout
this section, we consider a two-cell massive MIMO network,
i.e., L = 2. In addition, we set that there are eight users
in the network and four users in each cell, i.e., K = 4.
Furthermore, the length of the pilot sequence used during the
channel estimation is 3, i.e., τ = 3. Each BS designs the pilot
sequences based on the user load-achieving pilot sequence
design proposed in [3], [7]. Additionally, the downlink power
for all the users in the network is set according to the
pilot design [3], [7], where Plk =
δlkγlk
1+γlk
. Throughout this
section, we assume that during the downlink transmission
phase the active attackers transmit the AN with unit power,
i.e., PmA = 1.
We first compare the user load region of the network
with and without the active attackers. In this comparison, we
assume that the BS in each cell designs the pilot sequences
separately. Accordingly, we compare the per-cell user load
region. The SINR requirements for the users in the network
are set as γ1 = γ2 = [γ11 , γ12 , γ13 , 0.3]. Additionally, we set
that the effective bandwidth of the active attacker is 0.4. Fig.2
depicts the upper surface boundary of the per-cell user load
1
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Fig. 2. The upper surface boundary of the per-cell user load regions versus
the SINR requirements for the user load-achieving design with and without
an active attacker.
region with and without the active attackers in the network. In
this figure, the surface for the per-cell user load region without
the active attackers, labeled as GWBE, is obtained using (13)
and the surface for the per-cell user load region with the active
attackers, labeled as GWBEA, is obtained using (14). We note
that the user load region is significantly reduced by the active
attackers, even with only one attacker in a cell. Specifically,
having one active attacker in each cell reduces the user load
region by approximately 24.69%. The reduction in the user
load region indicates that a group of users with high SINR
requirements can no longer be successfully served in the pilot
contaminated massive MIMO network in the presence of the
active attackers.
In Fig. 3, we present the achievable downlink SINR perfor-
mance with a finite number of antennas at the BSs with and
without the active attackers. In this comparison, we generate
results using (11) and consider that L = 2, σ2w = plk = 1,
and βlkm = 1, where l = m, βlkm = 0.95, and l 6= m. The
SINR requirements for the users in the two cells are set as
γ1 = [0.91, 0.74, 0.64, 0.23] , γ2 = [0.94, 0.82, 0.45, 0.10]. We
note that the SINR requirements are carefully selected such
that they remain inside the user load reagin of the network
depicted as GWBE in Fig. 2. Additionally, we assume that
the active attacker in each cell transmits the pilot sequence
assigned to the first user in each cell. We clarify that the
active attacker does not need to design the pilot sequences
or know the full pilot sequence set designed for the entire
network. Instead, the knowledge that the user load-achieving
design is being used in the network is sufficient for the attacker
to know the pilot sequences assigned to at least L users in the
network. Fig. 3 depicts the achievable SINR for the two users
Nt
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t
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Fig. 3. The achievable SINR versus the number of antennas for the first user
(U11) and the fourth user (U14) in the first cell for the user load-achieving
design with and without an active attacker.
in the first cell with and without one active attacker in the cell.
We highlight that without the active attacker in the cell, the
SINR targets of all the users in the network can be guaranteed.
However, in the presence of the active attacker in the cell,
the SINR requirements of all the users in the cell cannot be
satisfied. For example, we observe that in the presence of the
active attacker, the achievable SINR for the first user in the
cell reduces from 0.90 to 0.69 when Nt = 200. As such, there
is an approximately 23.07% reduction in the achievable SINR
for this user. Importantly, the achievable SINR never meets
the SINR requirement even when the number of antennas at
the BS is infinite. In other words, the first user never achieves
the SINR target in the presence of the active attacker. We
note that the pilot sequence used by the first user in the
network is the same as the one used by the active attacker.
One important observation found in Fig. 3 is that the impact
of the active attacker on the fourth user (i.e., U14) in the
cell is negligible. This is due to the fact that the correlation
between the pilot sequence used by the fourth user and the
pilot sequence adopted by the attacker is very small.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an active attacking strategy on
the user load-achieving pilot sequence design in a massive
MIMO network. To this end, we first identified the potential
vulnerabilities in the user load achieving pilot sequence design.
Then, we proposed to increase the pilot contamination through
transmitting known pilots by the active attackers in the uplink
training. We demonstrated that the SINR requirements of all
the users in the network are no longer guaranteed in the
presence of the proposed active attacks. This is due to the
fact that the per-cell user load region is significantly reduced
by the active attackers. Specifically, the SINR requirements
of the worst affected users by the attack may not be satisfied
even with an infinite number of antennas at each BS in the
massive MIMO network.
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